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production, and is thus becoming a driving force in the
process of economic growth and development. This is
why countries are giving increasing attention to
external trade, which is becoming one of the strategic
elements of economic policy in both developed and
developing countries.
One of the most important phenomena of the past 40
years is not only the rapid expansion of international
trade, but the fact that it is associated with increasing
multilateralism, and the proliferation and diversifi-
cation of physical goods that enter into the global
market. Moreover, trade grew faster among countries
with similar factors' endowments, and intra-firm and
intra-indsutry international trade has become a salient
feature of international economic relations. Besides,
the global internationalisation of the economy implies
movements of factors of production: capital, labour,
technology, information, know-how. Finally, the
trade of intangibles (services, information, knowledge)
has been growing more rapidly than trade of tangible
merchandise. Behind these global changes we discover
technological change, and the ability to appropriate
and to master the new technology.
The changing characteristics of international trade
force countries to create a national infrastructure
which can provide a favourable environment and the
conditions for local firms to be competitive
internationally. The capacity of each country to insert
itself into the international economy, and to benefit
from the opportunities generated by the rapid
expansion of international trade to accelerate national
economic growth is becoming more and more
dependent on its technological capacity, and its links
with productive activities and trade policies.
It can be argued that the world economy is in a
transitional phase towards a new international
division of labour. This new international division of
labour is now at a turning point; there is a
confrontation between the hegemonie leader, and
those who, by their economic and technological
achievements, have the conditions to share and benefit
from leadership. The followers in their turn are
fighting for a better international position in order to
accelerate their economic development, and do not
want to be obstructed in their search and access to the
elements needed for it. The debate over the Uruguay
Round reveals that, despite recent progress in the
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1. Introduction: Latin America and the
Evolving Character of International Trade
The current Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations clearly reflects some of the most dramatic
changes in the world economy, and the efforts to
control the originating factors. The increasing
internationalisation of the world economy is forcing
national economies to restructure so as to adapt
themselves to the constraints and opportunities of the
emerging new international division of labour.
Two major interrelated factors are behind world
economic changes: a scientific and technological
revolution, and the shifts in international trade.
Scientific and technological flows have become
important components of international economic
relations. Today's world is not the same as that in
which GATT was created. On the other hand,
developing countries are faced with an enormous and
difficult task which, for the particular case of Latin
America is made more awkward by the current
disarray of national economies, marked by the
gloominess of external debt and slowing rates of
growth.
In 1988 the Latin Ameçican and Caribbean region
exhibited a further slowdown of the GDP rate of
growth to only 0.7 per cent. This poor performance
implies a level ofGDP equivalent to the regional GDP
per capita of 1978. The consumption per capita was
9.3 per cent lower than that prevailing in 1980. At the
same time inflation reached an average record of
470 per cent, with a consequent fall in real wages in
most countries. These eight years of continuous poor
performance have been associated with a massive
outflow of financial resources: since 1982 the total
transfer of resources outside the region reached 45 per
cent of the external debt at the end of 1988. The net
outflow in 1989 was equivalent to almost 25 pr cent of
the total value of regional exports of goods and
services, or approximately 4 per cent of the regional
GDP. Before 1982 the region was receiving annually
resources equivalent to 2.5 per cent of GDP. The
reversal of the situation implies a fall of about six
points - much the same as the decline in the regional
coefficient of capital formation [ECLAC 1988].
During the past 25 years the growth of international
trade has consistently exceeded the growth of world
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theory of international trade, the divorce between
theory and reality remains unshaken, and permits the
arbitrary interpretation of real facts and/or bastard
utilisation of concepts in order to legitimise political
decisions that are essentially the expression of
interests. Until the Tokyo Round, the main concern of
MTN was the liberalisation of international trade by
the elimination of tariff barriers. The new situation
forces the explicit consideration in the negotiations of
those new elements that have emerged preponderantly
during the last decade, and the incorporatioll of those
elements that, on the basis of special waivers, have
been left aside (e.g. trade in agricultural products).
This fact takes concrete shape in the different groups
established in the Uruguay Round.
2. The Tripolar Structure and Supranational
Economic Areas
An Emerging Tripolar Structure
One of the most difficult problems to be faced by Latin
America in the 1990s is the consolidation of
supranational economic areas. The strengthening of
the EEC and its macroeconomic and trade policies
have already affected the international trade system.
They are likely to have more relevance with the
implementation of the Common European Act in
1992. Besides, the recent free trade agreement between
the United States and Canada is likely to have
important effects on international trade, and in
particular on Latin American countries, which are
heavily dependent on trade with the United States.
In addition, the present pattern of international trade
is evolving towards a tripolar system based on
supranational economic areas: the EEC, the USA-
Canada free trade area, and an East Asian pole formed
by the four NICs (South Korea, Hong Kong,
Singapore and Taiwan), the four 'new' NICs
(Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia) and
Japan. This tripolar structure concentrates the most
important economic flows. In this scheme, Latin
America, with the exception of Brazil and Mexico, is
becoming increasingly marginalised.
This phenomenon is demonstrated by the historical
trends of trade flows, and by the magnitude and
direction of the flows of foreign direct investment,
which also tend to be concentrated in the tripolar
structure [see Bifani (forthcoming) for details of the
argument].
One of the most striking facts of the 1980s was the
increasing absorption by developed countries of
international flows of foreign direct investment, and
the decreasing amount that goes to developing
countries. Of the foreign direct investment (FDI)
which has gone to developing countries, the sources of
FDI have greatly diversified. For Latin America this
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decreasing flow of investment has been associated
with a change of direction: in 1980 the region absorbed
more than 60 per cent of FDI to developing countries',
in 1985 it obtained only 35 per cent, while the share
captured by Asian countries increased from 32 per cent
to nearly 50 per cent.
Net foreign direct investment in Latin America
dropped from US$ 7.Sbn in 1981 to US$ 2.8bn in
1986. The FDT to the region has been traditionally
concentrated in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and
Colombia [UNIDO 1989]. Apparently in 1988 the
inflow of FDI to the region recovered substantially,
approaching the levels of 1981. However, its
concentration persists: Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
accounted for an increase of US$ 5.9bn [1DB 1989].
Apart from the increasing trade relations and capital
flows between the three poles mentioned above, there
is also an increasing concentration of the flows of
intangibles, particularly of science and technology and
services between them.
Free Trade Areas: Liberalisation or Protectionism?
In theory, free trade areas, customs unions and
common markets are supposed to favour the process
of liberalisation by trade creation. However, also by
definition, a free trade area or a common market is
discriminatory against those countries that are not
members of it. Nevertheless, under GATT rules, free
trade areas and customs unions are permitted to the
extent that they are trade-creating and not trade-
diverting. In relation to this conflict, the experience of
the EEC can be divided into two periods. Until the
Tokyo Round, there was trade creation in relation to
manufactures, and trade diversion in relation to
agricultural products, a sector in which the EEC
benefitted from the waiver granted to the USA.
However, after the Tokyo Round the trade diverting
effects predominated. The EEC has also increasingly
resorted to protectionist measures in manufactures,
and has established a system of preferential
arrangements with developing countries that clearly
violates the principle of non discrimination. A similar
situation can be observed with the United States.
In this context the Latin American position appears to
have deteriorated, and indeed the level of protection
against imports from developing countries is higher
than the level of protection against the same imports
from developed countries [Sampson 1986]. Latin
American exports have been particularly affected by
the protectionism of the industrialised countries.
Between 1980 and 1985 the United States initiated 252
countervailing duties, actions of which 51 were against
Brazil and Mexico. The opening of Eastern Europe
and the more active participation of China in the
world economic system will, most probably, also act
against Latin American and Caribbean interests.
Besides Japanese concern about potential difficulties
of access to the European and North American
markets will define a structure of priorities in which
Latin America is likely to rank very low.
The current trend seems to assign to the region a
limited role of supplier of raw materials, mainly to one
of the poles of the tripolar structure, the United States,
which also provides the region with manufactures.
The Violation and Declining Credibility of GATT
Principles
Latin America's insertion in international trade is
impaired by the gradual abandonment of multi-
lateralism and the growing bilateralism outside GATT
rules, and supported by trade policies adopted
unilaterally that reduce market transparency. The
creation of free trade areas and their granting of
preferential treatment directly or indirectly transgress
the GATT basic principles of non discrimination,
unconditional most favoured nation and accelerate the
move towards bilateralism and reciprocity. Besides
selective liberalisation and trade restrictions infringe
the principle of special and differential treatment for
developing countries, undermining the efficiency of
GSP. In fact, the latter has become a negotiating tool
in the hands of developed countries to support
increasing bilateralism and reciprocity. The EEC's
pyramidal scheme of preferences discriminate against
Latin America that is at the end of a list headed by
countries of the Lomé Convention, and followed by
the EFTA, Maghreb, Mediterranean and Asian
countries.
Certainly there is the Global System of Preferences
(GSP). However, the results of its implementation
have been rather frustrating: first, by 1983 those
exports of developing countries protected by the
system show a rather small increase: only two per cent
[see Karsenty and Laird 1987]. On the other hand, the
US Trade Act authorises the US President to withdraw
the benefits of GSP from those countries which have
achieved higher levels of development and inter-
national competitiveness, implicity including
conditionality in granting the benefits of the GSP - a
new element of bilateral negotiations. The problem of
conditionality and reciprocity is likely to become a
major obstacle to the expansion of trade of developing
countries. Bilateral reciprocity ignores the multilateral
character of contemporary trade, and the fact that a
trade surplus does not necessarily indicate equal or
similar levels of development.
3. The Marginalisation of Latin America
During the l980s, Latin America faced a process of
increasing marginalisation in the world economy.
Indicative of this is the declining participation of the
region in international trade, which fell from 5.5 per
cent in 1980 to 4.2 per cent in 1986. Other indicators
are the diminishing inflows of FDI and the declining
share of the region in the total manufacturing value
added. Marginalisation is also noted at the sectoral
level, and revealed by the increasing concentration of
the region's external trade with only one partner, the
United States, which renders the region vulnerable to
the fluctUations of the US economy and its macro-
economic policies. Finally, the region is also
marginalised because of its inability to keep abreast of
new scientific understanding and technological
progress [see Bifani (forthcoming)].
However, it should be noted that the regional averages
hide the individual performance of each country,
which can have a different evolution. Thus in the case
of exports, Mexico and Brazil increased their share in
the global totals from 0.6 per cent and 0.8 per cent
respectively to 1.2 per cent each, while the share of
Venezuela and Ecuador (both oil exporters) declined
by more than 50 per cent.
Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile are the only
countries of the region that between 1982 and 1988
had a trade surplus. In 1988 the region as a whole had a
trade surplus of US$ 24.4 bn which Brazil contributed
with 78 per cent.
The Region's Exports of Manufactures
It is a well demonstrated fact that the driving force of
international trade expansion has been world trade in
manufactures. However, increased Latin American
participation in world trade has not been accompanied
by greater participation in manufacturing production.
The share of Latin American manufacture value
added (MVA) in world MVA declined from 6.4 per
cent in 1980 to 6.1 per cent in 1987 as a consequence of
a low rate of growth. Between 1961 and 1970 the MVA
increased at an average annual rate of 6.7 per cent. In
the following decade it was 6.4 per cent but from 1981
to 1988 it was a mere 0.5 per cent, and in 1988
particularly, it was negative: -1.5 per cent. Never-
theless, during the same period Latin American
exports of manufactures increased from 9.5 per cent of
total exports in 1970, to 24 per cent in 1986, and from
0.96 per cent to 1.6 per cent of world exports of
manufactures. This increase deserves two comments:
first, it was insufficient to compensate for the
deteriorating position of Latin America in world
trade. Secondly, the regional averages hide important
differences between countries. Manufacturing is
concentrated in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia
and Venezuela, which represent 86 per cent of the total
manufacture value added of the region.
The concentration is even higher when referring to
exports. Brazil alone accounted for 50 per cent of total
Latin American exports of manufactures in 1986,
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while Brazil with Mexico and Argentina accounted for
98 per cent of the regional total. It should be noted that
Mexican exports of manufactures are dominated by
two features: the role of the 'maquiladores' (1,132
plants in 1987), and concentration on a single market,
the United States, that absorbs nearly 70 per cent of
Mexican exports.
Disaggregation of the regional indicators unveils one
ofthe most dramatic facts of the region, the decline of
its industrial sector. By the middle of the decade,
industrialisation levels had shrunk to those of 1966,
with extreme cases, like Argentina and Peru,
regressing to the levels of 1960. In Chile and Uruguay,
the de-industrialisation process brought them back to
1950 levels [Bitar and Ominami 1987].
This regressive process affected all branches of
industry, although in different degrees, demonstrating
the shortcomings of an industrial policy limited to a
narrow concept of import substitution conditioned by
the dynamics of domestic demand without any export
aspirations. The policy was characterised by high
protection that in the long term proved to be
detrimental to the achievement of international
competitiveness, hence blocking the possibility of
reorienting industrial activity towards international
markets. The industry expanded with protection levels
that can not be justified by the traditional 'infant
industry' argument.
Protectionism in the context of the infant industry
argument is based on the distinction between static
and dynamic comparative advantage. Under the
infant industry strategy, protection is temporary, in
order to permit domestic activities to mature.
Unfortunately this has not been the case for Latin
American industry, which enjoyed excessive pro-
tection, inhibiting efforts to improve efficiency and
competitiveness.
In addition, only Brazil and Mexico, and, to a lesser
extent, Argentina, have domestic markets large
enough to achieve an efficient scale of production.
Latin American industrial policy was characterised by
an anti-trade protection bias [Teitel and Thoumy
1986; Balassa 1975, 1984 and 1985]. The negative
effects of excessive protection were aggravated by
inflationary processes and exchange rates policies,
particularly the over-valuation of the rate of exchange.
Excessive protection also marginalised industry from
global levels of technological progress and quality.
The policy neglected the complementarities between
import substitution and export oriented policies. The
former can be considered as a phase that precedes
export promotion. Apparently this has been the case
for Brazil and Argentina. As Teitel and Thoumy
noted, industrialisation through substitution could
result in export capability to the extent that the
protected domestic industry develops without losing
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sight of international competitive standards, and that
protection is based on incentives for the achievement
of international competitiveness and is not considered
as a permanent concession.
To sum up, when the driving force of the expansion of
the international economy is the growing exchange of
manufactures, the marginalisation of those countries
that are unable to build up internationally competitive
manufacturing activities is unavoidable, and their
position deteriorates even more if they encounter a
regressive industrialisation process.
Commodities and Latin America's External Trade
The problem of missing manufacture capabilities ïs
compounded by the lack of dynamism in the entire
external trade sector. Two countries, Brazil and
Mexico, have emerged as the dominant exporters of
the region contributing with 53 per cent of the total.
The potential offered by the increasing global demand
for manufactured goods has been exploited mainly by
Brazil [1DB 1989].
The historical trends of the external sector of the
region indicate a strict adherence to a static core and
periphery model that defines the region as a supplier of
primary products and an importer of manufactures;
80 per cent of the region's exports are primary
products, including oil, while imports are dominated
by manufactures.
The international commodity market is characterised
by a slow rate of expansion due to several well-known
factors, including low income elasticity and changing
patterns of consumption and declining terms of trade.
Nevertheless, primary commodities are still the main
sources of foreign income for the majority of the
countries in the region [Bifani Forthcoming].
The fall in demand for commodities also originates
from national strategies to achieve self-sufficiency in
agriculture and food production. Thus domestic
agricultural production is increasingly replacing
imports. This strategy is implemented both in
developed and developing countries. However, it is
particularly evident in the EEC which, from being a
net importer of food products is today the largest
exporter of cereals, meat, milk, sugar, etc. Moreover,
the explosion of the EEC's agricultural production,
sheltered by strong protectionism, resulted in growing
surpluses which are dumped in the international
market, depressing prices, displacing traditional
producers and creating uncertainty and instability.
It is interesting to note that while in developed
countries technological progress permeates all sectors,
allowing the expansion of the agricultural products, in
most Latin American countries agriculture is
characterised by serious technological backwardness.
This is particularly noticeable in the sugar cane
industry where levels of technology have not advanced
since the 1930s [Bifani Forthcoming]. This techno-
logical dimension is but one aspect of developing
countries' bias against agriculture and is particularly
serious when agriculture provide the most important
export products.
Thus regional specialisation concerns products for
which demand on international markets tends to slow
down and/or those where technological trajectories
are limited. Dynamic products in the international
economy are those linked with high technology,
electronic materials, computers, telecommunications,
spare parts for the automobile industry, and
aerospace. Products that are facing falling demand are
textiles, food and beverages, raw materials for
industrial transformation, tropical products, cereals
and so on. It is not necessary to do a detailed revision
of the structure of Latin American exports to realise
that almost all its exports are in the second group, the
exception being some Brazilian exports.
4. The New Issues of the Uruguay Round
Information and knowledge are strategic factors of
production that determine the characteristics of
international trade and are in themselves elements of
international exchange. Information and knowledge
are part of a set of intangible assets that are permitted
to reach international competitiveness. Among them
the property of knowledge and technology is one of
the most important. Technological innovation brings
together specialised services; thus flows of technology
are always accompanied by flows of services. The
more complex the new technologies, the more
frequent will be the supply of technology as a package
that also incorporates technical assistance, know-
how, training and maintaining services.
The relationship between transfer of technology and
FDI tends to be more evident in advanced
technologies. Since technical change plays a funda-
mental role in the expansion of the firm, it follows that
movements of capital and technology go together. The
links between the three new issues of the Uruguay
Round are particularly evident in the case of
information technology, and have been examined
elsewhere [Bifani 1989].
The importance of technological innovation for the
creation of comparative advantage and competitive-
ness, the growing commercial value of the intangible
component of technology and its easier diffusion,
associated with the globalisation of the world
economy have given rise to concern for the protection
of intellectual property which, indeed, has become a
leading issue in the trade policy of developed
countries, particularly in the United States. Moreover,
trade related aspects of intellectual property rights is
one of the top priorities of the US government and, the
Omnibus Act authorises the use of the IPR argument
to threaten countries with commercial retaliation if
they do not conform to US requirements on 1FR
[Bifani 1988 and 1990]. For all these reasons the
problem of intellectual property rights has acquired a
major role in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
[For a discussion of the economic issues involved, see
the paper by John Curtis in this Bulletin (editors).]
Negotiations on the trade related aspects of
intellectual property rights are basically a conflict
between the producers of technology, the technological
leaders, and the followers, who need it to speed up
their development process. The former emphasise
competitiveness on the assumption that competition
promotes economic growth; the latter emphasise
development. Thus technological leaders want to
reinforce at international level the existing
appropriability regime, making it tighter and more
suitable to the characteristics of new technologies.
Their purpose is to keep appropriated technological
innovations in larger geopolitical spaces and for
longer, in order to capture the maximum quasi-rent of
the investment on technological creation and
development, and, at the same time, to preserve their
advantageous economic situation in the world market.
The technological followers, particularly Brazil and
India, will try to enhance the diffusion mechanisms of
existing IPR, considering that a more strict
international appropriability regime may slow down
technological diffusion and reinforce the oligopolistic
character of the world economy. Thus they are of the
opinion that a strict international IPR system will
make their insertion in the international system more
difficult, thus hampering the development process
[Bifani 1990].
A report prepared by the United States Trade
Representative considers that Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico, Chile and Venezuela are adopting
restrictive practices in relation to North American
trade, notably Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, where
export subsidies are seen as a major obstacle to free
trade. The problem of property rights has been seen as
a major obstacle for trade relationships between the
United States and Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and
Venezuela [Bifani 1990].
5. Prospects for the Coming Decade
Previous discussion has highligted some of the issues
that have dominated international economic relations
during the last decade and Latin America's response.
From this analysis several reflections emerge.
One of the most important characteristics of the new
international economic relationships is the emergence
of a tripolar structure from which the region tends to
be marginalised. This structure exhibits on the one
hand the strengthening of the links between the
developed countries, particularly those associated in
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supranational economic blocks, with the NICs of Asia
and Japan.
On the other hand there is the growing diversification
of developing countries' interests, a phenomenon
particularly important in Latin America. The
insertion of the region into the world economy is
largely conditioned by the capability of each
particular country to incorporate technological
change, to achieve competitiveness in, traditional
sectors as well as in new ones, and to create
comparative advantages that permit the diversification
of exports. In the past only a few Latin American
countries, namely Brazil and Mexico, have been able
to achieve this. Both have large potential markets, a
rather diversified economy, and have been able to
build up a significant scientific and technological
infrastructure. This explains why, in spite of their
indebtedness, they are still the largest receivers of FDI.
This situation also gives them some bargaining power
in relation to TNCs, which are attracted by the
potential of their markets.
The region's critical situation, its inability to embark
on a process of sustainable development, has broken
its common position in relation to developed
countries. Each country is now trying to define its own
strategies in order to get maximum benefits from
international trade. For example, the collapse of the
sugar market created a dramatic situation for the
Dominican Republic, now considering joining the
Lomé Convention, and thus gaining access to the
preferential treatment that the EEC grants to the ACP
group. The sugar protocol of the Lomé Convention
established price levels and preferential quotas which
guarantee some stabilisation of export revenues.
Argentina would clearly benefit from the North
American position in GATT concerning the elimi-
nation of agricultural subsidies, whilst Chile has
recently modified its intellectual property law
following pressure from the Unitd States Government.
Mexico is a special case. Its close links with the United
States, the complementarities that can be developed
between the two economies, and with Canada, and
some recent agreements with the United States
(concerning countervailing duties), the modification
of the Mexican intellectual property laws, the rapid
elimination of non tariff barriers, suggest a trend
towards increasing integration with the United States
and Canada.
Brazil has been able to insert itself more favourably
than the rest of the region in the international
economic system. It is a country which offers
enormous possibilities for the expansion of economic
activities of transnational corporations because of its
large market. Yet, during the 1980s the expansion of
the Brazilian economy and its penetration in
international markets slowed down. Apparently the
country is at an important turning point characterised
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by the achievement of international competitiveness in
conventional industries which nevertheless face
growing barriers in developed countries (e.g. steel,
leather). On the other hand, it has developed new high
technology sectors relatively slowly. This is why for
Brazil the issue of property rights is so important in the
Uruguay Round, and this is a major cause of conflict
with the United States.
During the 1980s Latin America's policies were
conditioned by short term considerations due to the
pressing debt problem. This has affected the insertion
of the region into the international system by limiting
its capacity to import goods and equipment for
domestic development. On the other hand, it
promoted an export policy which attempted to
maximise short term foreign revenues in an effort to
generate resources for debt servicing. Thus the
countries reversed to their previous inward-develop-
ment strategy, closing their economies. Simultaneously,
a sort of new neo-mercantilism was adopted in order
to maximise trade surpluses.
The combination of the above two strategies prevents
them from diversification and the achievement of
international competitiveness. Today these policies
are proving detrimental not only to their insertion in
the world economy but also to economic development.
There is no doubt that the most dynamic factor for
development is provided by the expansion of the world
economy. The short term problems associated with
macroeconomic policies designed in the context of
structural adjustment prevented Latin American
countries from looking to the long term.
The coming decade confronts the region with a doubly
awkward task: to recover from the lost decade of the
1980s and to do so in the context of a more difficult
international economic environment which is
characterised by the slowing down of global growth,
increasing competitiveness, and growing pro-
tectionism. In an increasingly interdependent world,
sustainable development can be attained only through
the effective incorporation of technological change in
the productive process that allows creation of
comparative advantages and competitiveness, to
allow effective insertion in the international economic
system. For this, explicit scientific and technological
policy links with trade policies are required. This is, no
doubt, a serious challenge, but one which the region
has to face.
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